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Negotiations on agriculture were successfully launched in the WTO early in 2000. In the ini-
tial phase, negotiating proposals have been submitted by member countries and are being
discussed in special sessions of the WTO Committee on Agriculture. Astock-taking exercise
will be held in March 2001 to establish the next steps in the process. Many developments
will influence the shape and dynamics of the negotiations, particularly the possibility of a
comprehensive trade round.
The first part of this paper examines the policy setting for the negotiations. The ongoing inte-
gration of economies and accompanying agricultural policy reforms provide an environment
for further trade liberalization. Expansion of regional trade agreements and EU enlargement
negotiations add urgency to the multilateral negotiating process. Newer trade issues and non-
trade concerns, often connected to the food business, focus  attention on the agricultural talks
but may also retard them. A further factor that will add urgency is the anticipated expiry of
the Peace Clause in 2003. The paper reviews the main agricultural issues for negotiation and
the initial negotiating positions. Substantial progress in improving access is essential for the
negotiations to succeed. The issues of export subsidies, other forms of export competition,
unfair pricing practices, and dumping are receiving much attention. There are pressures to
reduce or eliminate all forms of trade-distorting domestic support. Many non-trade concerns
are being introduced, and legitimate trade issues will need to be addressed. The developing
countries are determined to extract a better deal for their agriculture. The paper concludes
that the elements for progress in further agricultural trade liberalization are coming to the
negotiating table but much uncertainty remains both within and outside agriculture.1
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T
he WTO negotiations on agriculture were launched last March in a “constructive and
business-like” manner as reported by WTO Director-General Mike Moore (WTO,
2000a). In a special session of the Committee on Agriculture, WTO members agreed to an
approach and a timetable for the first phase of the negotiations. While this may have sur-
prised some observers, particularly those who took over the streets of Seattle to obstruct the
negotiating process, agreement among the main players on the basis for launching the agri-
cultural negotiations was very close last December when WTO ministers backed away from
initiating a comprehensive round. With many developing countries complaining that the
Uruguay Round (UR) had failed them, the European Union asserting that it was no longer
bound by the Seattle draft text for agriculture, and an early impasse emerging over the
selection of a chairperson, a successful launch of these negotiations was nonetheless
achieved. Of course WTO members were committed at any rate to renew negotiations in
2000 under Article 20 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA); but in addi-
tion there is a substantial level of support among the main governments to continue down
the trade liberalization path, at least for agriculture. Countries agreed that the main negoti-
ating proposals are to be submitted by year’s end (2000) and a stock-taking exercise will
follow at a special session in March 2001. In the two special sessions, held in June and
September, several negotiating proposals were presented and discussed. Aprogram of tech-
nical work is underway. The next session took place in mid-November and meetings are
scheduled through to the end of 2001. 
While there is considerable skepticism that a substantial outcome for agriculture can be
achieved on its own, a review of proposals and proceedings to date indicates that useful
progress is being made. Indeed a number of developing countries are demanding progress
in agriculture and on some other issues, such as antidumping measures, as a precondition
for supporting a broad round. Following the recent Banff meeting of the Cairns Group
countries, the Brazilian agriculture minister is reported to have said, “If there are no impor-
tant negotiations in agriculture, we don’t see a reason for any round at all” (Reuters, 2000).
In related developments, the Council of Trade in Services met in special session in early
October to discuss guidelines for negotiations in that area. These negotiations are also part
of the built-in agenda from the UR, and some member countries want them to go ahead in
step with the negotiations in agriculture. Several proposals for agriculture link the negotia-
tions to other aspects of the WTO agenda, particularly sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues,
technical regulations, subsidies, dumping and countervail disciplines, intellectual property,
and discussions on the environment. A number of members, led by the EU, are committed
to pursuing a comprehensive approach to a new WTO round which could significantly
influence the issues and positions adopted by the major countries and groups in the agri-
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negotiations. Consequently this overview will examine:
• the setting –  the shape and dynamics of the negotiating environment; 
• the issues –  what will or should be brought to the table; and
• the positions –  what is known or anticipated for the major players.
This overview is based primarily on country proposals and statements in the WTO ses-
sions. It includes a summary of the positions of key members and groups of countries on




everal developments and issues are shaping and adding urgency to the agricultural
negotiations (Miner, 1998). Farm and food systems are restructuring rapidly in most
regions of the world in response to new technologies and changing consumer demands and
product markets. Both international and domestic developments are driving economies
more closely together and part of this integration is the expansion of trade in agricultural
products and services, and more direct investment. There are enormous opportunities and
potential benefits from more open economies and freer trade, but also significant risks and
adjustment pressures. 
Integration and Policy Reform
Although the negative aspects of globalization are receiving the bulk of public attention
today, most WTO governments have recognized the positive role of integration in improv-
ing economic performance and living standards and reducing poverty and environmental
degradation. Almost universally, they have embraced policy reforms and are continuing to
do so. Trade agreements are part of national policy responses, including in many cases the
need for further negotiations in agriculture. Although the process of globalization is being
blamed for many of the ills of today’s societies, and public protests are mounted regularly
in opposition to freer trade and more open economies, most of the grievances and concerns
identified by the protesters can be reduced through greater exchanges between nations
rather than the opposite. Increased trade and investment are viewed as the way to modern-
ize economies. Fortunately, more and more countries recognize the advantages of rules-
based international institutions to further their interests, as evidenced by the continuing
expansion in WTO membership. A majority of these new members are developing coun-
tries, or countries in transition to market economies, and most have a major stake in agri-
culture and the food business. 
Ashorter term factor that is lending urgency for some in the current talks is the decline
in farm income resulting from low commodity prices. Governments are under strong pres-
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stabilize commodity markets and prevent so-called dumping. Based on OECD calculations,
agricultural support to farmers has returned to pre–Uruguay Round levels. This has
increased the political pressure in Cairns Group countries to eliminate export subsidies, and
to place meaningful constraints on other forms of support that influence production and
trade. The U.S. Administration is supporting calls for removal of export subsidies even
though Congress has pushed financial support to U.S. farmers to record levels. With the
expiration of the U.S. Farm Bill in 2002, changes in Congress, and the election of a new
president, there is a clear risk that the authorization for current support levels will be con-
tinued or even augmented. This lends urgency to the demands from the Cairns Group, most
developing countries, and even the U.S. Administration, for stronger multilateral disci-
plines to constrain trade-distorting farm support.
Regional A g r e e m e n t s
The timetable for expansion of the EU to the east is also adding to the pressures for agri-
cultural policy reform. The EU needs comprehensive trade negotiations to complement its
agenda for enlargement. The potential membership of several Central and East European
Countries (CEECs) to the Union, scheduled to occur within five years, places the viability
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at risk in the absence of further reform.
Agriculture continues to play a key role in the CEEC economies, which are restructuring
and endeavouring to expand through exports. Restructuring is also continuing in EU coun-
tries, but at a more advanced stage. Yet, broader political considerations are driving the
enlargement process, and the agriculture sector cannot be isolated. The EU must develop a
basis to integrate CEEC agriculture into the Common Market while its own agriculture is
restructuring to operate in an integrated world. This will require further negotiations with-
in the Union, with CEEC members, and with third countries. The EU needs a comprehen-
sive round to incorporate the GATT Article XXIV:6 negotiations on enlargement and to
provide a more secure basis of rules and commitments to facilitate internal policy adjust-
ments. 
Similar pressures to integrate economies and restructure rural sectors are at work in
other regions of the world. This is demonstrated by the remarkable increase in regional
trade agreements, a trend that may be accelerating in the wake of the WTO setback in
Geneva (Josling, 2000). There are many examples of new agreements being forged involv-
ing Latin American countries and the EU, Canada and the remaining EFTA countries,
among Central European countries, the Baltics, the Caribbean countries, and to some extent
in the Pacific Rim and Africa. In the Americas, there are efforts to accelerate the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations with Canadian ministers in the forefront.
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announced a new trade pact. The principal focus of regional agreements is the freeing up of
trade and investment in order to encourage economic expansion on a competitive basis.
Regional agreements are intended to complement domestic policy reforms and the struc-
tural adjustments needed to participate in today’s integrated product and services markets,
and to improve economic performance and living standards. Increasingly agriculture is an
integral part of these initiatives. As the agreements generally go beyond WTO provisions,
they act as catalysts in multilateral trade liberalization. They also add greater urgency to the
WTO agricultural negotiations. 
Newer Issues 
A myriad of newer issues and non-trade concerns have become linked to the trade agenda,
whether or not they belong there. Most are legitimate issues, but they are also complex, sen-
sitive and emotional ones, without easy or obvious solutions. These newer issues are attract-
ing support and publicity, and public institutions are obliged to react. Undoubtedly the
information technology revolution and the ease of internet communications are catalysts in
the emergence of this new dynamic in trade negotiations. 
A surprising number of these emerging issues are connected to the food business and
many are being raised in relation to agricultural trade negotiations, no doubt for both sub-
stantive and tactical reasons. In addition to those already identified in the AoA, including
food security, food safety and quality, environmental concerns, resource conservation and
rural development, WTO members have raised such disparate issues as animal welfare,
biotechnology, species preservation, safeguarding the landscape, poverty reduction and
preservation of rural culture. Governments are under growing pressure to address all of
these issues either directly or in the trade talks. There is a need to improve the understand-
ing and management of many of these newer issues, preferably through targeted multilater-
al initiatives that treat trade as a residual consideration. They do focus attention on the agri-
cultural trade talks at this stage, but they clearly have the potential to retard the negotiating
process.
Peace Clause
Probably the most potent factor to create urgency in the agricultural negotiations is the pro-
vision in the AoA (Article 13) that the Due Restraint or Peace Clause expires at the end of
the transition period in 2003. The Article on Due Restraint provides protection during the
implementation period for measures that conform to the AoA in relation to actions based on
GATT94 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. If the article is not
extended or replaced, domestic support measures and export subsidies could be challenged
under countervail legislation or for nullification or impairment of benefits whether or not
14
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major subsidizing countries at risk of challenge, a situation that would be particularly dif-
ficult not only for the EU, but also for the United States, Canada, and a number of other
countries. Since the Peace Clause would disappear in the year that a new U.S. Farm Bill is
due, and at a crucial time in the EU enlargement exercise, there will be strong pressures on
the key negotiating countries to reach agreement on agriculture in the WTO by that time. 
Most observers are skeptical that a comprehensive round can be completed by 2004.
Not only must the United States obtain “fast-track” trade legislation, the EU will need addi-
tional reforms to the CAP to accept stronger multilateral commitments. Solid progress in
agricultural trade liberalization, including reform of the antidumping rules, is essential to
meet the demands of developing countries and would seem necessary for any deals to
emerge by 2004. On the other hand, the EU and Japan, probably with considerable support,
will insist that a comprehensive result must be in prospect before accepting additional com-
mitments for agriculture. There are many hurdles to be overcome before a broad round can




he mandate for the first phase of the agricultural negotiations is based on Article 20 of
the Agreement on Agriculture. This article establishes the long-term objective of “sub-
stantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform”
and provides direction for the negotiations. The AoA represented a basic shift in the rules
governing trade in agricultural products toward those applying to other goods, and member
governments agreed to continue the process of ongoing reform to move closer to this goal.
If members accept from the outset that new rules and additional commitments should be
based on treating agriculture as other goods are treated under the WTO general rules, the
negotiations will focus on the timing and conditions under which this is to be achieved. This
is implied by the positions adopted by the Cairns Group, and has been explicitly stated in
some presentations to the special sessions by the MERCOSUR countries and Australia.
However Article 20 contains greater flexibility by taking into account:
• experience from implementing reduction commitments;
• their effects on world trade; 
• non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment, the objective to establish a fair
and market-oriented agricultural trading system, and other objectives and concerns in
the preamble to the AoA; and
• what further commitments are necessary to achieve the long-term objectives.
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on Agriculture: (1) market access, (2) export competition, and (3) domestic support. To
these should be added the issues of special and differential treatment for developing coun-
tries, and non-trade concerns, making a five-issue agenda. In the first three areas, the AoA
used provisions primarily based on market-oriented mechanisms and competition rather
than managed trade. Hence, tariffication (conversion to tariffs) was used as the means of
removing exemptions and exceptions to the general rules as applied to agriculture, and first
steps were taken to eliminate all subsidies that distort trade.
Access Issues
Tariffication was a fundamental change that set the stage for negotiating greater access for
all agricultural products and placed a ceiling on border protection, since tariffs were bound.
Although reductions were agreed, and tariff quotas introduced as a temporary measure to
ensure a minimum level of access for all products, experience shows that only limited
improvement in overall access was achieved. For sensitive sectors such as sugar, rice, and
dairy, the levels of protection are extremely high. While country exceptions and the U.S.
Section 22 authority were removed, many border mechanisms that were in place to limit
and manage imports are continuing as tariff quotas or other devices. This is a key issue to
be addressed in the negotiations. Developing countries are adamant that they achieve
meaningful access, and they target sensitive products and technical barriers as priorities.
The access negotiations will focus on tariffs, tariff-rate quota volumes and their adminis-
tration, safeguards, and the operation of importing state trading enterprises (STEs).
With respect to tariffs, the principal issues identified to date are the depth and formu-
la for cuts, rate escalation and disparities, and zero-for-zero initiatives. For tariff quotas,
the concerns relate to increasing volumes, providing minimum access, removing country
allocations, and quota underfills and better rules for their administration. There are wide
differences over the need for import safeguards and how to deal with STEs. A number of
other access issues related to the AoA, such as dumping and food security, have been
emphasized, particularly by developing countries. The developing countries are also seek-
ing greater flexibility in how they can manage access to their markets in relation to market
stability and development. Several issues have been identified concerning the conditions
of access; these include food quality, genetically modified foods, geographic indications
and labelling, and animal welfare. 
Experience from implementing the UR outcome for agricultural access clearly demon-
strates that further commitments are necessary. If substantial reductions in protection are
to be achieved, tariffs that exceed a reasonable level, say 50 percent, cannot be justified,
let alone rates of several hundred percent. If a market-oriented system is to emerge, the
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If the system is to be fair, all products must be liberalized and tariff escalation and dispar-
ities between products should disappear.And this must be done in a manner that yields real
access benefits. Where special and differential treatment is given, it should facilitate effec-
tive development. Responses to non-trade concerns, if included in a renewed AoA, would
have to be consistent with the overall access objectives. There must be substantial progress
in improving agricultural access for the negotiations to succeed.
Export Competition
To date, negotiations on export subsidies and other forms of export competition have
received the greatest attention. The reductions in export subsidies, as anticipated, have had
the strongest impact on member country policies. These have affected the EU directly for
dairy and cereals, and indirectly for sugar. Stronger prices in cereal markets limited the
effects of the constraints, but they were a factor in policy decisions in both the United
States and Canada. The constraints were also a factor for dairy products in the United
States, Canada, and Australia.
In addition to the binding effects of the existing constraints, the serious decline in cere-
al prices and the continued use of export subsidies by the EU have stimulated an almost
universal demand from members for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies. There
are also calls for disciplines on export credits and other forms of export assistance, and on
exporting STEs. The negotiations on export competition are likely to spill over into a dis-
cussion of the impact two-price systems and price pooling have on trade. Since higher
internal prices can be used to benefit or cross-subsidize export shipments, and pooling
across time and markets can provide benefits to specific shipments, these mechanisms may
emerge as issues in negotiations to eliminate export subsidies. Cross-subsidization and
pooling are also linked to concerns over alleged subsidies and unfair pricing in state trad-
ing for export. Anumber of members advocate related disciplines on export restrictions and
taxes, and some seek a ban on dumping. 
It is in the area of export competition that the prospect of treating agriculture in a sim-
ilar manner to other goods is most likely to be achieved in this negotiation.
Domestic Support
Although it was recognized in the run-up to the UR that import barriers and export subsi-
dies were often an integral part of domestic policies, and substantial reductions in both sup-
port and protection were necessary for fundamental reform, the commitments on domestic
support were less binding than other constraints. This reflected the difficulty of negotiat-
ing disciplines for internal policies of sovereign states and the complexity of writing mean-
ingful commitments. The decision to distinguish between acceptable policies (green) that
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(amber) that should be reduced, provided the basis for the commitments. The focus on both
direct and indirect support in an aggregate measure permitted the inclusion of widely dif-
fering policy tools with varied trade effects. This approach was in line with the general sub-
sidy rules, which differentiate between non-actionable and actionable policies (but prohib-
it the use of export subsidies). The use of an aggregate measure of support (AMS) reflect-
ed the reluctance of some governments to accept constraints on a product-specific basis.
The inclusion of a blue box between the green (acceptable) and amber (distorting) cate-
gories was a further attempt to allow flexibility for policies intended to be production lim-
iting.
The experience with the domestic support commitments to date is that they have had
little direct impact. This is partly due to the high subsidies in the base period for the AMS
binding, and the improvement in prices in the first years of implementation, combined with
tighter budgets. There is considerable evidence that the domestic support disciplines have
contributed to the significant shift in farm policies from indirect support through market
interventions toward direct and decoupled government payments (Brink, 2000). Although
direct support is not included in AMS calculations if it meets certain criteria, the substan-
tial increase in transfers in recent years and the major imbalances that have resulted in pro-
ducer support levels between exporting nations are creating renewed trade tension.
In addition to the compromises that weakened the constraints on domestic supports,
strong concerns are emerging in relation to the growing level of subsidy transfers and their
impact on production and prices. The focus of these concerns is pressure to reduce or elim-
inate all trade-distorting domestic support. There appears to be a consensus that the disci-
plines should continue and be strengthened, although greater flexibility is proposed by
many importing and developing countries to accommodate non-trade and consumer con-
cerns and development needs. Areassessment of the policy criteria and composition of the
green, amber, and blue boxes is wanted by most, and a number would eliminate the tem-
porary blue box. A key issue is whether the AMS disciplines should be applied on a com-
modity-specific basis. There are a number of sensitive issues in this area related to the
Peace Clause and to the use of trade remedy legislation.
Other Issues
A broad range of relatively new issues is coming to the agricultural negotiating table in
addition to the basic elements now in the AoA. In the negotiation of Article 20, these con-
cerns were raised primarily by countries seeking to moderate the pace of trade liberaliza-
tion and agricultural policy reform (Tangermann, 1999). The AoA preamble identifies
some non-trade concerns. In the current discussions, the interest in non-trade issues has
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broad and disparate range of non-trade concerns alleged to be aggravated by trade agree-
ments. In any case, non-trade concerns were included in Article 20 and now form part of
the mandate for negotiations.
What are the non-trade issues for negotiation? Many of those raised, such as improv-
ing food security and protecting the environment, are already referred to in the AoA. Most
members indicate support for measures to achieve these objectives that complement the
trade rules. Many developing countries identify rural development, poverty reduction, and
enhancing food security as non-trade concerns to be addressed. Some propose a special
development box to provide flexibility to use trade measures to improve their situations. A
reduction in agricultural support and protection, with appropriate transition arrangements
for developing countries, combined with development aid, should reduce these concerns.
It is evident that the developing countries will pursue these issues in the negotiation. Some
developed importing countries have also identified food security, as well as rural viability
and culture, preservation of resources and bio-diversity, and several other non-trade con-
cerns to be taken into account in the negotiations. Generally, these concerns are raised by
members that maintain relatively high levels of support and protection, and apparently
want the issues dealt with in the negotiations on access and domestic support. Some con-
cerns, such as preserving biodiversity or protecting animal welfare, are issues to be pur-
sued on their merits in separate negotiations. Should multilateral agreements with trade
implications emerge on these issues, account could be taken of such disciplines in the agri-
cultural negotiations. If individual countries choose to subsidize for these specific purpos-
es, the programs should be considered in relation to the domestic support disciplines and
might find a home in the green box subject to agreed conditions. While there is no doubt
that a broad range of non-trade concerns will come to the negotiating table, it is difficult to
envisage specific rules to accommodate them, apart from the decisions taken to respond to
developing country needs.
The agricultural negotiations do not encompass the Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary
Measures (SPS) Agreement but several countries have raised SPS issues and a range of
other consumer concerns. These issues include concerns over food safety, GMOs, health
and sanitary requirements, and animal welfare. The key consideration at this stage is
whether the SPS Agreement will be opened for negotiation or these special concerns will
be addressed through the SPS Committee and separate working parties. The question of the
lack of financial and technical resources to implement SPS and technical requirements in
developing countries may also be part of the negotiations (Tangermann, 1999).
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he initial negotiating positions of the major WTO members and groups of countries
are beginning to emerge through proposals tabled in the special sessions of the
Committee on Agriculture, and country statements in the first three sessions (WTO,
2000b). The process is far more open than it has been in the past, with most proposals and
statements now available on the WTO web site. This is supplemented by a review of issues
raised in the preparatory Analysis and Information Exchange (AIE) process and in sub-
missions leading up to the ministerial conference in Seattle. The WTO Secretariat has pre-
pared summaries of the pre-Seattle submissions on some issues at the request of members
and this work is continuing. Anumber of public statements have been made on negotiating
objectives, particularly by those demanding policy changes or specific attention to new
issues. 
In discussing these initial negotiating positions it is important to keep in mind that this
is the first phase of the negotiations and it is taking place before governments have agreed
on the scope of overall negotiations and on whether there will be a comprehensive round.
A number of issues that may influence the modalities of the negotiations are under discus-
sion in the General Council, including demands for early progress in agriculture. There is
uncertainty over U.S. trade legislation and over the status and role of China in the WTO.
Although these considerations make any review of country positions tentative, if not spec-
ulative, a surprising degree of clarity is nonetheless emerging on the key issues.
European Union
The EU has not yet tabled a comprehensive position for the negotiations and apparently
does not intend to do so until later in the discussions. It has submitted proposals on the blue
box and other agricultural support measures, food quality and market access, animal wel-
fare and trade, and export competition. In addition to EU statements in the special sessions,
there have been numerous public comments by the commissioner for agriculture, Fischler,
on the EU position. The decisions on Agenda 2000 in the Berlin Declaration establish the
basis for the EU approach (Tangermann, 1999).
For the first time the EU submissions emphasize their role as the second largest
exporter of agricultural products and their major interest in negotiating lower trade barri-
ers. This reflects a growing recognition in Europe that its agriculture must become inter-
nationally competitive. The submissions also provide a means to balance external demands
for better access, as the EU wants improved market opportunities for their exporters to
accompany increased access to their market. However, the emphasis the EU gives to the
preservation of the European model of agriculture, and to a range of non-trade concerns to
enable agriculture to continue to fulfill its “multifunctional role”, appears to contradict a
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ture should not be exposed to international competition, and claims that greater access
should be made conditional on numerous non-trade concerns, seem to confront the objec-
tive of liberalizing agricultural trade. The EU statements emphasize that their concerns are
to ensure that trade does not undermine efforts to protect their consumers and animal wel-
fare, and are not a pretext for new trade barriers. But the EU has so far said much more
about non-trade concerns in relation to access than on the specific access issues. They
nonetheless support modest and balanced tariff reductions, improved rules for tariff quota
administration, and stronger disciplines for importing STEs, still with a continuation of
safeguards.
The 1992 CAP reform and the Berlin Declaration represent a shift from high internal
price supports toward market prices with direct payments decoupled from current output.
The EU position to date would not alter the basic elements of the domestic support provi-
sions in the AoA. In their experience the blue-box payments are working by increasing the
market orientation of producer decisions and restoring market balance. It is their position
that the concepts of the blue box and the green box must be maintained. They support
reductions in amber-box measures. The EU statements encourage further work on the mea-
surement of the impact and efficiency of support measures, particularly the “spillover” or
cross-border effects of support payments. Their comments do not rule out changes in the
categories, which could accommodate programs for non-trade purposes in the green box,
subject to specific criteria.2
The EU is prepared to negotiate further reductions in export subsidies provided all
forms of support to exports of agricultural and food products are dealt with in a compara-
ble manner. They identify an urgent need to develop rules and disciplines for subsidized
export credits, abuse of food aid, state trading, and some market support systems such as
loan deficiency payments. It is their view that officially supported export credits can act as
export subsidies and should fall within the WTO rules as is the case for industrial goods.
They want to quickly conclude a satisfactory OECD understanding on export credit for
agricultural products and integrate it into the agreement. On food aid, the EU wants to
revise the existing WTO provisions to ensure that aid is not tied in any way to commercial
exports. They consider that food aid should be provided in wholly grant form and not as
credits or as marketing tools.
The EU proposal on export competition identifies several ways in which STEs with
exclusive rights or privileges can circumvent the export subsidy constraints, including
cross-subsidization, price discrimination and price pooling. They also refer to anti-com-
petitive effects that may arise, and appear to connect the STE issue with competition law.
The EU wants to strengthen WTO rules and regulations applying to STEs based on further
21
W. M. Miner
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eanalysis. They would focus additional disciplines on the scope for circumvention of exist-
ing constraints, and the need for greater transparency and stricter notification requirements
related to indirect subsidization. And they identify a possible need for disciplines to limit
the anticompetitive effects of STEs in the agriculture and food trade, which may link this
issue with possible negotiations on trade and competition.
The focus of the EU approach to export subsidies is to achieve a balanced result with
equivalent action on all sources of export trade distortion. Their position on access is to
achieve improved opportunities for EU exports to accompany better access to their own
market. For domestic support programs, the EU accepts the need for progressive reductions
and seeks to tailor these and other disciplines to respond to the political pressures arising
from structural adjustments and consumer concerns. While the Commission is prepared to
negotiate further reductions in support and protection, and may even allow export subsidy
constraints and more import competition to drive structural reform and ease the pressures
of enlargement, a further tranche of CAP reform would be required to reach agreement.
The recent EU announcement of some adjustments to the sugar regime, with more to come
by 2003, is an encouraging indication that additional CAP reforms may be on the horizon
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2000).
United States
The United States succeeded in being the first to table a comprehensive proposal, with the
apparent objective of focusing the negotiations on the basic issues of trade liberalization
and accelerating the process. Their initial position places the emphasis on “long-term agri-
cultural trade reform” based on the elements of the current AoA and attaches a high prior-
ity and urgency to this task. Since the U.S. Administration found itself in the awkward sit-
uation of having no clear negotiating mandate, and elections which could change the pres-
idency and possibly the balance of power in Congress, they chose to stake out a broad posi-
tion within the established framework of the existing AoA. The United States proposes that
an agreement be reached by the end of 2002. Their comprehensive approach and short
timetable is intended to attract the support of the Cairns Group and many developing coun-
tries, while placing pressure on the EU and others to accelerate their policy reforms. It also
provides cover for a new administration to organize its priorities for trade legislation and a
new Farm Bill.
The key elements of the U.S. proposal are familiar, and include substantial reductions
or the elimination of all tariffs and disparities in tariff levels, substantial increases in tariff
quotas, elimination of export subsidies, disciplines on the use of export restrictions and
STEs, and the simplification of rules applying to domestic support. Breaking some new
ground, the United States proposes to establish a ceiling on trade-distorting support, and to
include disciplines covering trade in products of new technologies.
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negotiating modalities: (1) there can be no product exemptions; (2) existing disparities in
WTO tariff schedules must be substantially reduced or eliminated; and (3) the focus should
be on the most trade-distorting measures such as export subsidies, uncapped trade-distort-
ing domestic support payments, high tariffs, and unjustified restrictions on products of new
technologies. No doubt as intended, this list will get the attention of negotiators from the
EU, Japan, and Canada, but also from some U.S. groups.
The emphasis in U.S. access proposals on removing disparities in tariff levels with no
product exemptions is a means of attacking peak tariffs, tariff escalation, and wide varia-
tions between tariffs in and out of quota. Tariffs are to be reduced from applied rates, and
the United States wishes to eliminate the special agricultural safeguard. In addition to
increasing tariff quotas, the proposal calls for disciplines on tariff quota administration,
including trigger mechanisms for quota underfills. The exclusive import rights of STEs
should end, in the U.S. view, and notification requirements should include information on
import contracts. The United States supports sectoral negotiations such as zero-for-zero
and harmonization initiatives that go beyond the basic commitments.
The U.S. proposals in the area of export competition focus on eliminating export sub-
sidies over a fixed period and disciplining export STEs. As on the import side, the United
States would end exclusive export rights for STEs and require the notification of the
specifics of contracts. They would also eliminate government financial backing of STEs.
Although the U.S. position would require the elimination of their ability to provide export
subsidies under EEP and the dairy program, their statements indicate that the proposals
were “well received” by senior congressional leaders and farm representatives. As the
United States has made only limited use of export subsidies since the UR, and the EU is
virtually alone in their use, this proposal is on solid ground. However, the United States is
the main obstacle to achieving an OECD agreement to limit export credits and credit guar-
antees for agricultural products. These talks have been ongoing for six years but they have
a target for completion by the end of 2000. The principal hurdle is the repayment period,
with the United States offering to halve the current understanding to 18 months. Other par-
ticipants, including Canada, want the period to be shorter, in line with commercial loans
for food products. This issue is linked to developing country interests in longer credit
terms, and to export subsidy disciplines, including the U.S. desire to force STEs to report
the terms of their loans. While the United States wants to keep export credit disciplines in
the OECD, these linkages will make it difficult to do so.
The U.S. proposal on domestic support is aimed at further substantial reductions in
trade-distorting programs, and addressing the issue of disparities in support levels in a way
that simplifies the disciplines. They propose two categories, one for exempt measures
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is non-exempt and subject to reduction commitments. A formula approach for reductions
is proposed to reach a final bound level, fixed as a percentage of the value of total agri-
cultural production, which is to be applied to all members. Programs that promote sustain-
able agriculture and rural communities in a non-distorting manner would be exempt, sub-
ject to criteria. Similarly, programs in developing countries considered to be essential to
their development and food security would be exempt.
The apparent U.S. objectives are to further reduce the trade distortion in domestic sup-
port, reduce imbalances between levels of support, and refine the categories to better
accommodate new policy directions and developing country needs. It is unclear why a
switch in category designations from green to exempt, and amber to non-exempt, would
simplify the system, apart from discarding the blue box. It would seem to risk opening up
the criteria to renegotiation, which would be counterproductive. The proposal to bind non-
exempt support in relation to the value of total production could address over time the
growing problem of inequities in support levels provided the large subsidy programs were
captured. It is not clear what would happen to blue-box support, or how the current U.S.
loan deficiency payments and other income transfers would be treated. Since almost any
program has the capability of distorting production and trade given sufficient funding, a
limit in support in relation to output has some logic. The merit of the U.S. proposal at this
stage in the process is to open up the domestic criteria for reassessment and greater clari-
ty. The challenge will be to construct the correct boxes and constraints, and put the pro-
grams back where they belong.
The U.S. proposal also addresses special and differential treatment and food security.
In addition to further criteria for development support, the United States proposes that
members intensify technical assistance and give special consideration to tariff reductions
of interest. To strengthen food security, the United States would renew existing commit-
ments for food aid in the Uruguay Round Decision and the WTO disciplines. They also
would strengthen WTO disciplines on export restrictions.
Cairns Group
The Cairns Group countries played an aggressive and constructive role in the UR and are
continuing to do so in the current negotiations. Some members presented proposals on their
own, or as participants in other associations, but the group has maintained solid support for
the AoAand the need for further reforms of all three basic elements. The group has tabled
proposals on export competition and domestic support, and an access proposal is being
developed. The members of the group share common but not uniform positions on access.
A Canadian access proposal has been tabled and is discussed separately, as are the posi-
tions of some developing countries.
24
W. M. Miner
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eThe Cairns Group position on export subsidies is straightforward and unambiguous.
They propose the elimination and prohibition of all forms of export subsidies for all agri-
cultural products. The elimination is to be achieved through a substantial down payment in
reductions for outlays and volumes in the first year followed by an accelerated process of
reductions until subsidies are eliminated. It is noted that from 2004 the exemptions for agri-
cultural export subsidies from actions under WTO rules will disappear with the Peace
Clause. It is proposed that the reduction begin from the bound levels at the end of 2000 for
developed countries, and from 2004 for developing countries. The proposal also calls for
the elimination of any subsidy elements in other forms of unfair competition, including
export credits, export guarantees and insurance, and other non-commercial transactions. 
The group favors the provision of effective mechanisms, such as longer implementa-
tion periods, to assist developing countries to adjust to the reform process. They also
request that countries entitled to use export subsidies during the negotiations exercise
restraint and reduce their use.
The Cairns Group also proposes major reductions in domestic support and eventual
elimination of all forms of trade- and production-distorting mechanisms. For reductions,
the group proposes a formula approach, beginning with a substantial down payment. The
reductions would apply to all AMS and blue-box programs and, on a disaggregated basis,
to all agricultural products. Areview of green-box criteria is proposed to ensure that all its
programs are at most minimally trade distorting. Again, maximum restraint is called for
during the negotiations. Anumber of special and differential provisions are identified in the
proposal, including specific green-box provisions, a differentiated AMS formula to encour-
age diversification, and enhanced technical assistance.
The subsidy targets of the Cairns Group are both the EU and the United States. For
export subsidies their position reinforces the U.S. comprehensive proposal, although dif-
ferences emerge in relation to export credits and food aid. Even the EU position goes some
way down the same road on export subsidies. But for domestic subsidy transfers the Cairns
Group confronts the programs of the two largest trading entities. The proposal for a sub-
stantial down payment in all trade-distorting support, both amber and blue, and a tighten-
ing of the criteria, no doubt to capture the large EU transfers and U.S. market loan defi-
ciency payments, sets the Cairns Group apart. And their position has the support of many
developing countries whose demands will help shape the final outcome.
The position and influence of the Cairns Group in the access negotiations is not entire-
ly apparent at this stage. Various statements made by Australia and New Zealand imply that
they will demand deep tariff cuts—particularly for peak tariffs—and the removal of tariff
escalation. Both countries will pursue substantial increases in tariff quota volumes and
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group are likely to share these objectives but to tailor their proposals to various specific
needs.
C a n a d a
Canada has tabled a negotiating proposal on market access which differs in several aspects
from other members’ positions although it complements the overall thrust of the Cairns
Group. The position reflects domestic sensitivities over supply-managed commodities, and
the mix of tariffs and tariff quotas used to protect these sectors, combined with the need to
expand product exports on a competitive basis. The access negotiations at the close of the
UR were condensed and incomplete. There are wide disparities in tariff levels between
countries, between competing products, and in the tariff quota system. The Canadian pro-
posal seeks to address these issues through a formula approach for single-stage tariffs and
a rules approach for two-stage tariffs and tariff quotas.
By applying a formula reduction to single-stage tariffs, the proposal would yield great-
ly reduced tariffs and less tariff dispersion. If the final bound rate does not provide effec-
tive access, it is proposed that a duty-free tariff quota should be opened. For tariff quotas,
rules would be used to achieve a minimum common level of access as a share of con-
sumption on a product basis. In-quota tariffs should be eliminated. The proposal also
endorses zero-for-zero sectoral initiatives, and supports this approach for oilseeds and
oilseed products, and barley and malt. Stronger disciplines on export restrictions and taxes
are also advocated.
These proposals were put forward as ideas for discussion and they have already attract-
ed some reaction. There is broad support for examining the rules for tariff quota adminis-
tration, but there is concern over creating more of them. There is support for comprehen-
sive tariff cuts and for reducing peak tariffs and tariff escalation, but some opposition to
sectoral negotiations. The Canadian proposal highlights the need for serious access nego-
tiations, and the importance of reducing tariff dispersion and escalation. It also retains and
might even expand the tariff quota regime that represented an unfortunate step backwards
in an AoA designed to promote market-oriented mechanisms. Since many countries includ-
ing Canada now apply tariff quotas, the objective must be to expand or remove them, and
to ensure that their administration allows uninhibited access.
Some Developing Countries
Through their performance at the Seattle ministerial meeting, and in subsequent meetings
of the WTO General Council and other committees, the developing countries have demon-
strated a determination to influence the trade agenda and to extract a better deal in a new
round. As these countries form a majority of the WTO membership, and a focus of their
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group of countries will have a significant influence on the negotiations. However, they are
not a homogeneous group, and only a few have tabled positions on specific agricultural
issues.
In addition to the proposals from the Cairns Group, which includes many developing
export countries, a number of statements have been presented representing the views of
various developing countries. A group comprising Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, and El Salvador tabled
a proposal on special and differential treatment and a development box, and the green box.
India supported this proposal and joined with several of these countries to comment on
market access. The MERCOSUR countries presented a paper on export subsidies related
to food security and dependency. Several other developing countries have expressed views
on aspects of the discussions. Although the sponsorship and content of the proposals varies,
an attempt is made here to summarize these positions.
The principal thrust of the proposals from developing countries is to reinforce the role
of special and differential treatment in the AoA. They emphasize food as part of national
security and propose various forms of flexibility in the rules to encourage agricultural
development. Some support a development box, which would encompass programs
designed to protect and enhance domestic food production, including programs created to
prevent dumping of cheap and subsidized food. These countries are concerned that the
green box has sheltered programs that have increased support in OECD countries, and pro-
tected the OECD countries from countervail actions. The green box is also criticized for
meeting the non-trade concerns of industrial countries, and not the food security needs of
developing nations. The main group of countries, including India, recommend that all
domestic support be placed in a general box, and only a common, modest level of support
be allowed.
On market access these countries emphasize that the AoA has not led to increased mar-
ket opportunities for the developing nations. They identify a number of weaknesses in the
access arrangements and propose that the negotiations address tariff peaks and escalation
in developed countries using a harmonization formula. The tariff quota administration must
be simplified in their view and operated to improve access for developing countries.
Difficulties in meeting SPS requirements are identified. Several of these submissions rec-
ommend that dumping be prohibited and export subsidies eliminated, and that domestic
support provided by developed countries be substantially reduced and bound.
The MERCOSUR countries, with some support from regional partners, submitted a
different view on the merits of seeking food security through importing subsidized com-
modities and using grant aid. They advocate steps to strengthen domestic economies in
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of export subsidies and liberalization of trade in agriculture as the “real” solutions to food
security.
J a p a n
Although Japan has not presented a negotiating proposal, they have commented on their
approach and put some issues on the table. Japan considers that agriculture should be part
of a broad round of negotiations. They stress the need for fair and equitable rules that rec-
ognize the multifunctional role of agriculture. Japan seeks some redress in the balance of
rights and obligations between exporters and importers.
For domestic support, Japan wishes to maintain the current framework, including the
blue box which is seen as an intermediate stage to facilitate adjustments from amber to
green policies. They support including non-trade concerns in the green box. Japan prefers
a product-by-product approach to tariff negotiations, including tariff quotas. They support
a review of the administration of tariff quotas.
Japan considers that export subsidies and export restrictions were treated with more
leniency in the AoAthan import restrictions. They stop short of advocating the elimination
of export subsidies, at least for now. Japan supports the strengthening of export disciplines
in a comprehensive way including export subsidies, export credits, export taxes, and export
restrictions.
These comments, when supplemented with the views expressed by Japan in the AIE
process, indicate that their position will be similar to their UR approach. Japan continues
to emphasize the non-trade roles of agriculture, the country’s major dependence on food
imports, and the need to safeguard the food industry and a stable food supply. Although
Japan like most countries is undertaking agricultural policy reforms, and its food industry
is slowly restructuring and opening up to the world market, their cautious and defensive
approach to agricultural trade negotiations appears to be continuing.
C o n c l u s i o n
T
hese are early days to attempt an assessment of the main issues and positions in the
WTO negotiations. This review indicates that the agricultural talks are off to a satis-
factory start. The foresight of the UR negotiators in agreeing in Article 20 to continue the
reform process through negotiations at the end of the implementation period is serving its
purpose. The structure and main elements of the negotiations appear to have been estab-
lished.
The WTO members are participating in the renewed negotiations in a constructive
manner. Several major countries or groups have tabled negotiating proposals, and others
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ments. The developing countries have demonstrated their serious involvement and deter-
mination to achieve a useful result. 
This review is incomplete. A number of countries in transition to market economies in
Eastern Europe and the Baltics have made interesting statements that are not covered, as is
the case for Norway, Mauritius and several other members. The status and role of China in
the negotiations is yet to be determined although it is likely to be significant, particularly
in agriculture.
The positions being taken almost without exception reveal that domestic policy
reforms are continuing, and in the direction of more open economies. But agricultural
reforms are moving at a slower pace in certain countries and sectors which can be expect-
ed to retard the negotiating process. The emergence of non-trade concerns as part of the
agenda will require careful management to ensure that only legitimate trade issues are
addressed in the WTO. So despite a positive beginning, many obstacles must be overcome
for the negotiations to make real progress.
Furthermore, a number of elements must fall into place outside the agricultural nego-
tiations to make a substantial outcome possible. The most crucial in terms of results is a
decision on the scope of the overall round and whether progress can be made on related
issues. A key question is whether comprehensive negotiations can be organized to provide
the political and economic basis for major progress on agricultural trade reform. The alter-
natives would be no result, or a modest agreement on its own, based on the current com-
mitments. Since a failure would cut across the plans for EU enlargement and represent a
serious setback for developing countries as the major industrial markets turn inward, this
outcome appears improbable. A stretched out negotiating process is more likely to occur
with the possibility of a limited, interim agreement in agriculture. This would require an
extension of the Peace Clause in some form, and complementary farm legislation in the EU
and United States.
Acomprehensive round, if it can be launched, is likely to take at least five years. Asub-
stantial outcome would represent a major move forward in applying the general rules to
agriculture. This would require that the EU take additional steps to link its farm prices to
the world market, and accept with the United States a substantial reduction in farm sup-
port. Lower subsidy transfers are essential if EU agriculture is to become internationally
competitive and U.S. agriculture is to stay that way. The EU and United States would have
to undertake serious negotiations in sugar and dairy, with others joining in. The United
States and EU would have to accept a timetable to eliminate export subsidies, accompanied
by disciplines in other forms of export competition. For Canadian agriculture this would
involve adjustments in the supply-managed sectors, and a more open CWB system.
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Would the positions revealed so far yield such a result? Certainly the developing coun-
tries will not back away from their demands for greater access in textiles, clothing, and
agricultural products. The World Bank and other international institutions are increasing
their efforts to find effective ways of assisting these countries to restructure their
economies and increase growth through exports. The EU policy changes underway are
headed in the direction of further trade liberalization, but the emphasis is on caution and
balance. And the EU will not move ahead of the United States in agriculture, so the
Americans will have to show leadership through action on farm subsidies. The U.S. posi-
tion presents a dilemma, as the administration appears willing but lacks the authority to
proceed. Congress rules in farm policy, and is responsive to pressures from rural America.
A similar situation prevails in relation to efforts to advance multilateral rules in the areas
of antidumping, countervail, and competition legislation. A related question is whether the
United States will seriously pursue a FTAA. If so, this would accelerate negotiations on the
more difficult issues. The Cairns Group countries can be counted on to maintain the pres-
sure for early action on agricultural subsidies. The non-trade issues will not go away, and
some have the potential to create serious trade tensions. In the longer term, consumers will
decide for themselves on such issues as GMOs and animal welfare but governments will
have to establish some rules and standards so that markets function effectively.
The elements for progress in agriculture are coming to the negotiating table. The Peace
Clause and related developments will force the pace. Obviously there is too much uncer-
tainty outside agriculture to offer any predictions on the eventual outcome. But so far the
indications are encouraging and provide a basis for confidence that the process of funda-
mental reforms in agricultural support and protection will continue.
E n d n o t e s
1.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Agri-Food Trade
Research Network Workshop on Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Can We Make
Progress? Quebec City, Quebec, October 2000.
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